The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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292
Sec, et PdGfORN
Chapter 6
The second new version of the OXCART was another recon­
naissance aircraft. In December 1962 the Air Force ordered six
"reconnaissance/strike" aircraft, which were designed to conduct
high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance of enemy territory after a
nuclear strike. This new aircraft differed from other A-12 versions in
that it was longer, had a full-blown two-seat cockpit, and carried a
large variety of photographic and electronic sensors. The additional
weight of all this equipment gave the Air Force craft a slower maxi­
mum speed and a lower operating ceiling than the Agency's A-12. In
August 1963, the Air Force added 25 more aircraft to this contract,
for a total of 31. 3'
THE QUESTION OF SURFACING
A VERSION OF THE OXCART
As the funds being spent on Air Force versions of the OXCART in­
creased dramatically, the Defense Department became concerned that
it could not offer any public explanation for these expenditures. At
the same time, Agency and Defense Department officials recognized
the growing danger that a crash or sightings of test flights could com­
promise the program. This led the Defense Department in late 1962
and early 1963 to consider surfacing the Air Force's interceptor ver­
sion of the A-12 to provide a cover for OXCART sightings or crashes
and an explanation for the rise in Air Force spending. Some journal­
ists had also become aware of the aircraft's existence, raising concern
that the secret would eventually come out in the press. Agency offi­
cials remained reluctant to reveal the existence of any version of the
A-12, and the issue soon came to the attention of the PFIAB. James
Killian and Edwin Land strongly opposed disclosing OXCART's ex­
istence, and in January 1963 they presented their views to President
Kennedy at a meeting attended by DCI McCone and Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara. Killian, Land, and McCone succeeded
in persuading the President and Secretary of Defense to keep the
OXCART's existence a secret for the time being.
Later that year supporters of the idea of surfacing the OXCART
found a more powerful argument for their proposal-the need to dis­
seminate the supersonic technology that had been developed for the
'' OSA History. chap. 20. pp. 71-72 (TS Co1kword) .
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