The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 6
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OXCART. This technology would be invaluable for Air Force pro­
jec!s such as the 8-70 bomber and for the civilian supersonic trans­
.po.rt (SST) then being discussed in Congress. [n the fall of 1963,
several Presidential advisers expressed their concern to DCI McCone
that Lockheed had received a $700 million headstart in the develop­
ment of supersonic technology, giving the firm a tremendous ad.van­
tage over other aerospace companies working on a supersonic
transport. McCone passed these concerns on to President Kennedy on
12 November 1963, just 10 days before the fateful trip to Dallas. The
President instructed CIA and the Defense Department to develop a
plan for surfacing the OXCART but to await further discussions with
him before taking any action.
30
President Lyndon B. Johnson received a detailed briefing on the
OXCART program from McCone, McNamara, Bundy, and Rus:k on
29 November, after just one week in office. McNamara strongly ad­
vocated surfacing a version of the OXCART. McCone was more cau­
tious, calling for the preparation of a statement that could be 1USed
when surfacing became necessary but arguing that such a step was not
"John A. McCool!...Memorandum of !vketing in Cabinet Room for the Purpose of
Discussing the Surfacing of the ox:· 21 January 1963. DC! records (TS Codeword);
idem. Memorandum for the Record. Discussion with the President-October 21 st--6:00
p.m.. 22 October 1963. DCl records {S): OSA fliswry. chap. 20. pp. 73-7-' (TS Codeword).
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