The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
yet needed. Agreeing with McCone's position, President Johnson said
the issue should be reviewed again in February."'
One additional argument in favor of surfacing the OXCART was
the realization that the aircraft could not be used to fly undetected
over the Soviet Union. By 1962 the United States had become aware
of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar system, codenamed TALL
KING. The introduction of this computer-controlled radar undercut
one of the basic premises of the OXCART program, the assumption
that radar operators would not be able to track high-flying supersonic
targets visually because of their small, nonpersistent radar returns. By
coupling a computer to a radar, the Soviets could now weight the in­
dividual radar returns and identify those produced by high-flying,
very fast objects.·'
By February 1964 DCI McCone had become convinced that sur­
facing was necessary. Soviet development of the TALL KING radar
system had eliminated his hope that OXCART would eventually be
able to carry out its original intended purpose-overflights of the
USSR. The final decision on the issue of surfacing the OXCART
came at a National Security Council meeting on 29 February 1964, at
which all of the participants supported the decision to surface. That
same day President Johnson held a news conference at which he an­
nounced the successful development of an .. advanced experimental
jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more
than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet.".~
President Johnson had spoken of the A- I I rather than the
Agency's A-12, and the aircraft that was actually revealed to the pub­
lic was the Air Force's YF- l 2A interceptor. a project that had already
been canceled. ➔' Following the President's announcement. two of
"'John A. McCone. "Memorandum for the Record. Meeting with the President. Secretary
McNamara. Mr. Bundy and DC!." 29 November 1963. DCI records (TS); OSA History.
chap. 20. p. 73 (TS Codeword).
"OSA History. chap. 20. pp. I-n-149 (TS Codeword).
'' John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record. "Discussion at the NSC Meeting.
Attended by the President. all members and the four members of the President's personal
staff. 29 February 1964," 2 March 1964. DC! records (S); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p.
14-erroneously identifies the date as 24 February-(S).
" President Johnson ·s use of the designator A-11 at the press conference has sometimes
been called an error, but Kelly Johnson wrote the President's press release and chose this
designator for security reasons because it referred to the earlier version of the aircraft that
lacked the radar-defeating modifi1.:ations of the A-12. Johnson, "Archangel log," 25
February 1964.
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