The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Although overflights of the Soviet Union appeared to be out of
the question, the OXCART's eventual employment elsewhere in the
world remained a strong possibility, particularly after the Cuban
Missile Crisis of October 1962 demonstrated the continuing need for
manned strategic reconnaissance aircraft. Since satellites had not been
able to supply the kinds of coverage needed, U-2s had carried out nu­
merous overflights of Cuba. Nevertheless, the U-2 remained vulnera­
ble to surface-to-air missiles (as had once again been demonstrated by
the downing of a SAC U-2 during the Missile Crisis), and project
headquarters had even briefly considered sending the A-12 over Cuba
in October 1962, even though the aircraft still lacked the required 158
engines and would have had to use much less powerful ones.'' After
the Missile Crisis ended, Air Force U-2s continued to photograph
Cuba under a tacit superpower understanding that such monitoring of
the withdrawal of the missiles would proceed without interference.
But the possibility of future Soviet or Cuban action against the U-2s
remained, raising the dismaying prospect that the United States would
not be able to tell if the Soviet Union was reintroducing ballistic mis­
siles into Cuba.
Such fears became acute in the summer of 1964 after Soviet
Premier Nikita Khrushchev told foreign visitors such as columnist
Drew Pearson, former Senator William Benton, and Danish Prime
Minister Jens Otto Krag that, once the US elections had been held in
November, U-2s flying over Cuba would be shot down. Project head­
quarters therefore began preparing contingency plans (Project
SKYLARK) for the possible employment of OXCART over Cuba,
even though the new aircraft was not yet ready for operations. On 5
August 1964, the Acting DCI, Gen. Marshall S. Carter, ordered the
project staff to achieve emergency operational readiness of the
OXCART by 5 November 1964, in case Premier Khrushchev actually
carried out his threat to shoot down U-2s. 5z
To meet this deadline, the Office of Special Activities organized
a detachment of five pilots and ground crews to conduct flights to val­
idate camera performance and qualify pilots for Mach 2.8 operations.
Simulating Cuban missions during training flights, the detachment
"On 23 October 1962 Johnson noted in his "Archangel log": that the performance of an
A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for possible use over Cuba)
would be "hardly spectacular."
'' Johnson, .. Archangel log,.. 17 August 1964; Minnich, "OXCART Story,.. p. 19 (S );
OSA History, chap. 20. p. 81 (TS Codeword).
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 6
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