The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Seeret NOFORN
Chapter 6
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5
November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the
Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa­
bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these
preparations were valuable training for the OXCART program, even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the
A- l 2s were reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer­
gency operational status on 5 November 196-+. the aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned
electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless. a
senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and
jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic
warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use
of existing ECM devices c_ould, in the event of the loss of an
OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment
used by Air Force bombers and fighters. Even if OXCART's ECM
devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force
still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to
work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach
to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to
develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen­
erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar
cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also
developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the
OXCART. 53
As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im­
prove, there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft
overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas­
ing. On 18 March 1965, DCI McCone, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the
" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 1-49-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by
John Parangosky. OSA records (TS Codeword).
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