The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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growing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the People's
Republic of China. In three years the Agency had lost four U-2s over
China, and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones.
The three men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps
needed for the OXCART to operate over China so that it would be
ready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.
Project BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations.
called for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on
Okinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown to Okinawa
for 60-day periods, twice a year, an operation which would involve
about 225 personnel. Later there would be a permanent detachment at
Kadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the
Defense Department spent $3.7 million to provide support facilities
and real-time secure communications on the island by early autumn
I 965. 5"
In the summer of 1965, after the United States had begun intro­
ducing large numbers of troops into South Vietnam. Southeast Asia
beca!Ue another possible target for the OXCART. Because the contin­
ued use of U-2s for reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam was
threatened by the deployment of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles.
McNamara asked the CIA on 3 June 1965 whether it would be possi­
ble to substitute OXCART aircraft for U-2s. The new DCI, Adm.
William F. Raborn, replied that the OXCART could operate over
Vietnam as soon as it had passed its final operational readiness tests. 55
Formal consideration of proposed OXCART missions involved
the same approval process that was used for U-2 overflights. In late
November 1965, after the OXCART had passed its final validation
tests, the 303 Committee met to consider a proposal to deploy the
OXCART to Okinawa to overfly Southeast Asia and China. Although
the committee did not approve deployment, it ordered the develop­
ment and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability, ready to deploy
to Okinawa within 21 days after notification.
There the matter remained for more than a year. During the first
half of I 966, DC[ Raborn raised the issue of deploying the OXCART
to Okinawa at five separate 303 Committee meetings but failed to win
" OSA Hiswry. chap. 20, pp. 90-91 (TS Codeword).
"Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. 21 (S).
See, et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
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