John Company

The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

CIA-UAP-003 · page 316 of 406

Page 316 of 406 of CIA-UAP-003

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Soviet missile system. As early as 1962, the intelligence community
began to be concerned about the actual purpose of new missile instal­
lations that first appeared near Tallinn, Estonia, and soon spread along
the northwestern quadrant of the Soviet Union. Attempts to photo­
graph the sites using reconnaissance satellites had been frustrated by
the prevailing cloud cover in the region. Because of the lack of accu­
rate information about the missile sites, there was a wide divergence
of views within the intelligence community about their purpose.
These views ranged from the CIA's belief that the installations con­
tained long-range, surface-to-air missiles designed to counter strate­
gic bombers, to the Air Force's contention that Tallinn sites
represented a deployed antiballistic missile system.
Photointerpreters insisted that imagery with a resolution of 12 to
18 inches was necessary to determine missile size, antenna pattern,
and configuration of the engagement radars associated with the sys­
tem. Electronic intelligence (ELINT) analysts also needed data about
the Tallinn radars, but there were no collection sites that could moni­
tor the Tallinn emanations when the radars were being tested.
Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that prevented analysts from knowing the fre­
quencies or any other performance characteristics of the radar.
To settle the question of the purpose of the Tallinn installations.
Office of Special Activities planners proposed a mission that would
use the high resolution of the OXCART's camera along with the
U-2's sophisticated ELINT-collection equipment. This project's un­
classified name was Project SCOPE LOGIC; its classified title was
Operation UPWIND.
The proposed project involved launching an A-12 OXCART air­
craft from Area 51 in Nevada and flying it to a Baltic Sea rendezvous
with a Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great
Britain. The OXCART would fly north of Norway and then turn south
along the Soviet-Finnish border. Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12
would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the coasts of
Estonia, Latvia. Lithuania, Poland. and East Germany before heading
west to return to Area 51. The entire flight would cover 11,000 nauti­
cal miles, take eight hours and 38 minutes, and require four aerial re­
fuelings.
Although the A-12 would not violate Soviet airspace during this
dash, it would appear to Soviet radar network operators to be headed
for an overflight penetration in the vicinity of Leningrad. It was
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