The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 6
hoped that the A- 12's passage would provoke Soviet air defense per­
sonnel to activate the Tallinn system radars in order to track the swift
OXCART aircraft. As the A-12 made its dash down the Baltic, its
Type-I camera would be filming the entire south coast. If Agency an­
alysts were correct in their assumption that the Tallinn system was de­
signed to counter high-altitude aircraft at long ranges, then the
OXCART would be in jeopardy during this dash down the Baltic.
Nevertheless, Agency weapons experts believed that the A-12 air­
craft's speed and suite of electronic countermeasures would keep it
safe from the standard Soviet surface-to-air missile installations.
While the A-12 was conducting its high-speed dash along the
Baltic coast of Eastern Europe, the U-2 would be flying farther out to
sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs. The U-2 would be
able to collect the Tallinn radar installation's ELINT emanations.
Agency and Defense Department officials supported the pro­
posed mission, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The Tallinn radar installation remained of great interest to
the intelligence community, and in the late 1960s the CIA attempted
to develop a small, unmanned reconnaissance aircraft that could pho­
tograph Tallinn and other coastal areas. The project (AQUILINE) was
abandoned in 1971 (see appendix E).
FIRST A-12 DEPLOYMENT: OPERATION BLACK SHIELD
Although the Tallinn mission was still being considered in May 1967,
another possible employment for the OXCART came under discus­
sion. This time the proposal was for OXCART to collect tactical
rather than strategic intelligence. The cause was apprehension in
Washington about the possible undetected introduction of sur­
face-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam. When President Johnson
asked for a proposal on the matter, the CIA suggested that the
OXCART be used. While the State and Defense Departments were
still examining the proposal's political risks, DCI Richard Helms
"Memorandum for DOC! R. L. Taylor from C. E. Duckett. DDS&T...Collection of Photo
and ELINT Data on Tallinn Sites Utilizing the OXCART and the U-2... 4 May 1967.
DS&T records (TS Codeword).
Sec, el