The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

310
Secret NOEQBN
Chapter 6
In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the
Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President
Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina­
tion of the OXCART program by I January l 968.
This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an
orderly phaseout of the A- l2. This activity was known as Project
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense
Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l 2s would gradually
be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of
January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7ls would as­
sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would
add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by I December
1967. Until these capabilities were developed, OXCART was to re­
main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast
Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con­
ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 3 l May
I 967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.
the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.
Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders
began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue
was reopened.
The CIA contended that the A- l 2 was the better craft because it
flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main­
tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three
different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de­
tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef­
fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each
other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an
A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by
one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.
The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre­
sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli­
gence organizations.
The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro­
vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I
camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe­
rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and
., Minnich. "OXCART Story," p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codi:word) .
..See.at