The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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models. The Secretary of Defense rejected this recommendation. pre­
sumably because the SR-7 l would not be operational by September
1966.""'
In July 1966, at the Bureau of the Budget's suggestion, a study
group was established to look for ways to reduce the cost of the
OXCART and SR-7 l programs. The study group consisted of C. W.
Fischer from the Bureau of the Budget, Herbert Bennington from the
Department of Defense, and John Parangosky from CIA. The study
group listed three possible courses of action: maintain both fleets,
mothball the A-12s but share the SR-7ls between CIA and the Air
Force, or mothball the A- l 2s and assign all missions to Air Force
SR-71 s. On 12 December 1966, four high-level officials met to con­
sider these alternatives. Over the objections of DCI Helms, the other
three officials-Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, Bureau of
the Budget Director Charles L. Schultze, and Presidential Scientific
Adviser Donald F. Hornig-decided to terminate the OXCART fleet.
Concerned that this recommendation would strip the CIA of its super­
sonic reconnaissance capability, Helms then asked that the SR-71
fleet be shared between CIA and the Air Force.''
Four days later. Schultze handed Helms a draft memorandum for
the President requesting a decision either to share the SR-71 t1cet be­
tween CIA and the Air Force or to terminate the CIA capability en­
tirely. Having just received new information indicating that the
SR-71 ·s performance was inferior to that of the A-12. Helms asked
for another meeting to review this data. His concern was that the
SR-71 could not match the photographic coverage that the A-12 could
provide. Only one of the SR-71 's three camera systems was working
anywhere near the original specifications, and that was its Operational
Objective system which could only photograph a swath 28 miles wide
with a resolution of 28 to 30 inches. The A-12's Type-I P-E camera
could photograph a swath 72 miles wide with a nadir resolution of 12
to 18 inches and oblique resolution of 54 inches. Thus, the A-l2's
camera covered three times as much territory as the SR-71 's camera
and did so with better resolution. In addition. the A-12 could fly
2.000 to 5.000 feet hig:her than the SR-71 and was also faster, with a
maximum speed of M';ch 3.1 compared with the SR-71 's Mach 3.0.""
~ OSA Hisron. ch:1p. 20. p. 130 (TS Codeword); Minnich. --oXC.-\RT Story:· p. 30 (S).
,. OSA Hiswn: ch:1p. 20. pp. 130-133 (TS Cmkword): Minnich...OXCART Swry:· pp.
30-31 (5).
= Minni<:h. '"OXCART Story:· p. 31 (SJ: OS.\ Histon·. pp. 133-13-+ (TS Codeword).
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 6
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