The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Chapter 7
315
U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man­
.agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over
the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very
long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develolP ef­
fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.
Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers
planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of
the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program
focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.
Once operations began, however, project managers found them­
selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex­
pectations, the U-2 could not fl y undetected. Its overflights led to
Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not
wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to
harm relations during more favorable intervals. President Eisenhower
placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one
and greatly limiting their number. Yet. the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf, he
valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at
times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was
falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, fi rst in bombers and then in
missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over­
fl ights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which
no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.