The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

316
Sec, et NOFORN
Chapter 7
The low level of overflight activity did not prevent the U-2 from
accomplishing a lot in the four years it flew over the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. Twenty-four U-2 missions made deep penetra­
tion overflights of the Soviet Union: six by Detachment A from
Germany, three by Detachment C from the Far East and Alaska, and
15 by Detachment B from Turkey and Pakistan, including the unsuc­
cessful Powers mission.
The amount of information these missions gathered was impres­
sive. By the summer of 1960, the U-2 project had developed more
than 1, 285,000 feet of film-a strip almost 250 miles long. The U-2s
covered more than 1,300,000 square miles of the Soviet Union, ap­
proximately 15 percent of its total area. [nformation from U-2 photo­
graphs was used to prepare 5,425 separate photoanalytical reports. 1
Numbers alone cannot describe the importance of the U-2 over­
flight project. [n a 28 May 1960 memorandum, after Powers was shot
down, DCI Allen W. Dulles described the program's accomplish­
ments: '"Five years ago, before the beginning of the U-2 program, ...
half knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of its true power
position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were
faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or
of needlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on misdi­
rected military preparations of our own." Dulles went on to describe
the U-2's contribution in gathering information on four critical as­
pects of the Soviet Union's power position: its bomber force, its mis­
sile force, its atomic energy program, and its air defense system.1
The first major contribution of intelligence collected from U-2
overflights was the exposure of the "bomber gap" as a myth. Contrary
to the US Air Force's claims, the Soviet Union was not building a
large force of long-range bombers. Armed with information from U-2
overflights, President Eisenhower was able to resist pressure to build a
large US bomber fleet to meet a nonexistent Soviet threat.
' DCI Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Statistics
Relating to the U-2 Program." 19 August 1960, Operation MUDLARK tiles, OSA re­
cords. job 74-8-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).
'The original draft of this document was probably written by James Q. Reber. It was then
revised by DCI Dulles. "Accomplishments of the U-2 Program," 27 May 1960. Operation
MUDLARK tiles, OSA records, job 74-B-605, box 2 (TS Codeword).
SeeFot