The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Sec, el NOI-O"N
Chapter 7
involvement in fndochina, U-2 photography provided accurate and
up-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and tield commanders, as­
sisting them in crisis management and the planning of military opera­
tions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitoring cease-fire agreements
in the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war
in 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.
By the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned
strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was no longer seriously
considered. The political risks were too high. especially since the
quality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing
steadily. Thus, the OXCARTs only operational use was for collecting
tactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART gath­
ered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus. in January
1968. OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo
and showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any
large-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance
program was the many advances in technology that it generated.
Thanks to simplified covert procurement arrangements and the lack
of detailed and restricting specifications, creative designers such as
Kelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The
U-2, designed to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at
best, proved so successful that, even after its original area of activity
became too dangerous for overflights at the end of four years, the air­
craft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service
with other government agencies.
The OXCART is an even better example of the technological ad­
vances generated by the CIA's reconnaissance program. Although the
OXCART was designed almost 30 years ago and first flown in 1962.
its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to the use of new materials in aircraft construc­
tion. Unfortunately. the technological breakthroughs that made the
OXCART possible took longer than expected. By the time the aircraft
was ready for operations, the missions originally planned for it were
not practicable. The tremendous technological achievement repre­
sented by the OXCART ultimately led to the aircraft's demise by in­
spiring the Air Force to purchase its own version of the aircraft. The
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