The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

319
Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 7
PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE U-2 PROGRAM
From the very beginning of the overflight project, US Allies provided
valuable support. Bases in Germany, Turkey, Norway, and Pakistan
played a major role in overflights of the Soviet Union. Bases in India,
Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines greatly assisted operations in
Asia. Two Allies-the United Kingdom and Nationalist China-made
an even greater contribution to the U-2 program by providing pilots
and conducting overflights. British pilots began flying in late 1958
and conducted two important overflights of the Soviet Union in late
1959 and early 1960. After the end of such missions in May 1960, the
need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew
only training or ferry missions, although their use for operational mis­
sions was considered on several occasions.
The end of overflights of the Soviet Union reduced the impor­
tance of British participation but resulted in the addition of a new
source of pilots when the focus of interest for the U-2 in its strategic­
intelligence-gathering role shifted to the People's Republic of China.
The United States and Nationalist China had been conducting joint
r~<;onnaissance projects over the Chinese mainland since the
mid- l 950s, and in 1961 the CIA equipped the Nationalist Chinese
with the latest in reconnaissance aircraft, the U-2. For the next 12
years, Agency U-2s with Nationalist Chinese pilots brought back
large quantities of information on the development of Communist
China's armed forces, nuclear technology, and economy. Such
information was extremely important to US policymakers. Nationalist
China paid a high price in lives for its participation in the U-2
program: seven pilots died (five in training accidents and two on
overflights), and another three were captured.
U-2s AS COLLECTORS OF TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
The low level of mission activity over the project's original target­
the Soviet Union-was initially very frustrating for CIA project man­
agers, but the U-2 soon found new missions not originally envisioned
for the program. With its strategic-intelligence-collection role often
on hold, the U-2 became highly useful as a collector of tactical intelli­
gence during crisis situations.
Beginning with the Suez Crisis of 1956 and continuing with sub­
sequent Middle Eastern wars, a rebellion in Indonesia, Sino-Indian
border fighting, and culminating in support to the growing US
-ieerct