The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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26
Set1et NOl'ORN
Chapter 1
wingroot areas to withstand the hi.gh speeds and sharp turns man­
dated by the standard military airworthiness rules added too much
weight to the airframe, thereby negating the efficiency of the sail­
plane wing.
In short, it was possible to achiieve altitudes in excess of 70, 000
feet, but only by making certain that all parts of the aeronautical
equation were in balance: thrust, !lift. and weight. The only plane
meeting these requirements, Donovan insisted, was Kelly Johnson's
CL-282 because it was essentially a sailplane. In Donovan's view, the
CL-282 did not have to meet the S[Pecifications of a combat aircraft
because it could fly safely above Soviet fighters.....
Donovan's arguments convince:d the Intelligence Systems Panel
of the merits of the CL-282 proposal, but this panel reported to the ·
Air Force, which had already rejectc:d the CL-282. Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September I954-the members of the Intelligence Systems Panel and
high-ranking Air Force civilians such as Trevor Gardner-these back­
ers were all connected with the Air !Force. They could not offer funds
to Lockheed to pursue the CL-282 c,oncept because the Air Force was
already committed to the Martin RB-57 and the Bell X-I6. Additional
support from outside the Air Force was needed to bring the CL-282
project to life, and this support would come from scientists serving on
high-level advisory committees.
The Technological Capabilities Panel
The Eisenhower administration was growing increasingly concerned
over the capability of the Soviet Un,ion to launch a surprise attack on
the United States. Early in 1954, Trevor Gardner had become alarmed
by a RAND Corporation study waming that a Soviet surprise attack
might destroy 85 percent of the SAC bomber force. Gardner then met
with Dr. Lee DuBridge, Presiden t of the California Institute of
Technology and Chairman of the Office of Defense Mobilization's
Science Advisory Committee, and criticized the committee for not
dealing with such essential problems as the possibility of a surprise
attack. This criticism led DuBridge to invite Gardner to speak at the
Science Advisory Committee's next meeting. After listening to
" Donovan interview (S); Baker in1erview (S}.