The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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30
Sec, et NOFORM
Chapter 1
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24-25 May meeting of Baker's Intelligence Systems Panel, he did not
realize that that plane and the one in Strong's drawing were the same.
As soon as Land saw Strong's copy of the CL-282 drawing. however,
he telephoned Baker to say, ·•Jim, l think l have the plane you are
after." 50
A few days later, when Land showed Kelly Johnson's conceptual
drawing to Baker and the other Project Three members, they all be­
came enthusiastic about the aircraft's possibilities. Although Baker
had heard Allen Donovan·s brief mention of the Lockheed design in
May, he had not yet seen a drawing of the aircraft because Donovan
did not report to the ISP on his early-August trip to Lockheed until 24
September. After seeing the CL-282 drawing, Baker began designing
a camera and lens system that would fit in the Lockheed craft. 51
At the end of August, Land discussed the CL-282 with Allen
Dulles's Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard
Bissell, who came away from the meeting without any definite ideas
as to what Land wanted to do with the aircraft. Overhead reconnais­
sance was not uppermost in Bissell's mind at the time, and it was un­
clear to him why he had even been contacted. 51 Bissell's outstanding
academic credentials, his acquaintanceship with James Killian
through his previous teaching experience at MIT, and his direct access
to DCI Dulles may have led the Technological Capabilities Panel
members to consider him the best CIA point of contact.
Although surprised that he had become involved in the CL-282
project, Bissell's interest was piqued, and he set out to learn what he
could about reconnaissance systems. In early September 1954,
Bissell had Douglas E. Ashford, a young Air Force officer on his
staff, put together a general status report on air reconnaissance pro­
grams. Bissell forwarded the 16-page study to the Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence (DDCI), Lt. Gen. Charles Pearre Cabell, USAF,
on 24 September. In a covering memorandum, Bissell called Cabell's
'" Baker interview (S).
" Ibid.
'' Bissell interview (S).
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