The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

82
Gee, et NOFOAN
Chapter 2
Arthur C. Lundahl
ARC gave the top priority target list to the Project Director, and
tlie project staff's operations section then used the list to plarn the
tlightpachs for U-2 missions. Although the requirements committee
was not responsible for developing flight plans. it assisted the plan­
ners with detailed target information as required. When a flight plan
was ready for submission to the President for approval, the committee
drew up a decailed justification for the selection of the targets. This
paper accompanied the flight plan.(J
[n developing and pnontIz1ng lists of targets, the committee
members had to take into account the varying needs and interesIts of
their parent organizations. Thus, the CIA representatives generally
emphasized strategic intelligence: aircraft and munitions factories,
power-generating complexes. nuclear establishments. roads. bridlges.
inland waterways. In contrast, the military services usually plac,ed a
heavier emphasis on order-of-baule data. The Air Force. in panicular.
had a strong interest in gathering intelligence on the location of
Soviet and East European airfields and radars.
Although the committee members kept the interests of their ser­
vices or agencies in mind. their awareness of the vital nature of their
mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted
to reach a consensus before issuing its recommendations, although oc­
casionally this was not possible and one or more agencies would add a
dissent to the recommendation of the committee as a whole."
5
PREPARATIONS TO HANDLE THE
PRODUCT OF U-2 MISSIONS
On 13 December 1954, DCI Allen Dulles and his assistant. Richard
Bissell, briefed Arthur C. Lundahl. the chief of CIA's Photo­
Intelligence Division (PID), on Project AQUATONE. At !DC[
Dulles's direction, Lundahl immediately set in motion within his divi­
sion a compartmented effort, known as Project EQUINE, to plan for
the exploication of overhead photography from the U-2 project. With
only 13 members, the PID staff was too small co handle the expe,cted
~ lbi<l.: Jam.:s Q. Reber. interview by Donald E. Wd·lenbach and Gregory W. Pedlow.
Wash ington, DC. 21 May 1987 (S).
"' Reber interview (Sl.
Gec,et