John Company

Department of the Air Force Report, 1996

DOW-UAP-D048 · page 14 of 181

Page 14 of 181 of DOW-UAP-D048

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It is obvious from the response-mode definitions in Appendix A that none of the described
vehicle failures can be considered as a Mode 1, 2, or 3 response, or a Mode-4 on-trajectory
failure.• Except possibly for (2), it also seems apparent that none can be modeled as either a
rapid tumble or a slow tum.
• Although prompt destruct action during any of the described flights might have resulted in a Mode-4
classification, the safety officer typically needs several seconds to evaluate data after a malfunction.
Quick action is contrary to safety philosophy if impact limit lines are not threatened and the destruct •
system is not at risk, since additional flight time enhances the user's opportunity to pinpoint the
nature of the problem.
9/10/96
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RTI