The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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denied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared,
RADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of
responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces." s,
By this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead re­
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa­
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of
COMOR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed
that the While House had given responsibility for peripheral recon­
naissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim. and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study.
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho­
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.
5
! The last CIA
U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
. 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and
Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange­
ments with the host governments.
Until the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na­
tional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk fac­
tor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routine. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
C[A received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S).
·'' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chairman. COMOR. "Proposo::<l
Procedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. " 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls
(TS Co<kwor<l).
See. et NOFORN
Chapter 4
Seerct