The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction.
the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of
the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." u Because the danger
posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special
Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford
(USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a
vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over
Cuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight
over San Cristobal.
As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre­
sentative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it
would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis­
hap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance
mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel
Ledford"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the
.DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were
much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior
electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford
then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv­
ing familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting.
McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the
San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots.'"
Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives
met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA
Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air
Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot
should not be used until he had received adequate training. The con­
versation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission,
the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the
U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI
McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left
'·' Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword).
" Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington.
DC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr..
Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans for of Cuban
Overflight Responsibility," 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17.
folder 18 (S).
Sec, el PdOfOFmi
Chapter 5
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