The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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secret 1\JoFonra
Chapter 5
DOC/ Marshall S. Carter
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsibility, to include com­
mand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re­
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
Defense.
05 The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act."
16 In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra­
tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. The Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu­
nication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admit­
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit.•· •~Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were in vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra­
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
'' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).
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