The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for
National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that
"the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children." 19
Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the
President had already made.
Once the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its
complete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming
overflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the
CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and
the CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to
familiarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the
weather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the
island took place.
When the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October,
photointerpreters had found evidence of the presence of MRBMs in
the San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately
notified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI
McCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evi­
dence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser
Bundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed
the President on the results of the 14 October mission."0
Now that the presence of Soviet medium-range surface-to-sur­
face missiles in Cuba had been confirmed, the rules for U-2 mission
approval changed. The Strategic Air Command received blanket ap­
proval to fly as many missions as needed to cover Cuba completely,
without again consulting the Special Group. During the week that fol­
lowed the discovery of the missiles, SAC U-2s conducted multiple
missions each day (see map on page 203). U-2 photography was sup­
plemented by low-level photography taken by high-performance
Navy and Air Force aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 pilots remained idle, but the
photointerpreters at NPIC did yeoman service in studying the
,., Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 12 October 1962,
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo" 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
,. For a more detailed account of NPIC's discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. see
Dino Brugioni. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I. 29 August-16 October 1962, DDS&T
Historical Series. NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC. 1971) (S).
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
Seeret