The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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Set1 el NOP'OAN
Chapter 1
15
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this
plane can be produced within a year from the date oforder: Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years..
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor­
mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most Air Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de­
sign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro­
cess of choosing the modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new
Bell X-16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked
S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hired
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell.
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"'
Philip Strong
Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be­
fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud­
ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the
end of 1951, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United
'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.
'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OSI-I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS
Codeword).
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