The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Text

This text came with the file. It may have mistakes. When the text and the image disagree, the image is right.

317
The ·'bomber-gap" controversy was soon followed by a "mis­
sile-gap" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda
campaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and
deploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet
Union along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside
the known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA
to conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that "the
Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program;
instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at
achieving an early ICBM operational capability." 3 As with the
controversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2
photography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac­
celerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent
liquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop­
ment of more reliable solid-fueled missiles.
U-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet
Union's atomic energy program, including the production of fission­
able materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the
location and size of nuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such. U-2 pho­
tography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated
the nuclear testing moratorium.
One of the greatest contributions of the U-2 program was to in­
crease the capabilities of the US deterrent force. Before the U-2 over­
flights, most target information was based on obsolete materials
dating back to World War II or shortly thereafter. With the assistance
of U-2 photography, the Defense Department could allocate weapons
and crews more efficiently and identify many new targets. U-2 photos
also proved invaluable in determining the precise location of targets.
One further contribution to the capabilities of the US deterrent force
was the information that U-2s collected on the Soviet air defense sys­
tem. U-2 photography located Soviet fighter airfields and gained in­
telligence on new fighter models. Special electronic intercept and
recording equipment carried on many U-2 missions enabled the CIA
to analyze the technical characteristics, operational techniques, and
radar order of battle of the Soviet Union's electronic defenses. This
information was vital both for planning the routes for US deterrent
forces and for developing electronic countermeasures.
' Ibid.. p. 3 (TS Codeword).
Secret ~OFORl<J
Chapter 7
-Scc,er