The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

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318
See. et NOFORN
Chapter 7
The U-2 program not only provided information on individual
Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet
intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in
May 1960:
Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of
a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether
the situation might get beyond control-that someone on the
other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. ...
Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result­
ing from the overflight program. has given us an ability to dis­
count or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have
been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori­
cal than threatening and that our courses of action could be
carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet
interference. 4
Dulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put­
ting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelli­
gence effort, noting that "in terms of reliability, of precision, of
access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has
been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and
of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been,
to put it simply. invaluable."
The impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is
harder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered
was a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a
costly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s
by showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups
of strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the
other hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations
with Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit
meeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower
relations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2,
the Soviet Cnion's strategic military capabilities would have
remained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist
pressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out
major increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned
relations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of
overflights did.
' Ibid.. pp. 9- IO (TS Codeword).
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